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Abstract 
Repatriates’ experience and knowledge is 
important competition advantage for the parent 
company in international business. This paper 
discussed repatriates’ incentive mechanism based 
on the perspective of knowledge transfer, 
established theoretic model of repatriates’ 
knowledge transfer incentive mechanism, and 
pointed out that knowledge transfer was a process 
of repeated game between the parent company and 
the repatriates, the establishing of knowledge 
transfer incentive mechanism was trying to reach 
the equilibrium of the game, it provided theoretic 
basis for promoting repatriates’ knowledge transfer 
effectively.  
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Introduction 
Given the globalization of economies, the number 
of the expatriates is on an upward trend, 
consequently, repatriates management has been 
paying more attention. For a long time, researches 
from home and abroad always put emphasis on 
repatriates’ welfare and demand satisfaction from 
the perspective of cross-culture management. 
However, there is a neglected problem, what effect 
repatriates’ uncoded knowledge and the implication 
of that knowledge will have on increasing the level 
of the knowledge and enhancing the development 
of company. In practice, the result is that the 
repatriates choose to leave the company for they 
can’t bring their ability into play, accompanied with 
the companies’ lose for the spillage of knowledge. 
This paper solved this problem discussed above, it 
explored the repatriates’ incentive problem under 
knowledge transfer, in order to improve strategy 
consciousness for knowledge transfer, and provided 
theory evidence for establishing reasonable 
repatriates’ incentive mechanism. 
 
Repatriates: knowledge assets attribute 
Repatriates is not only a key resource to the 
knowledge about the host country’s market and 
economy, but also the important channel for 
transferring the knowledge across nations, they are 
the company’s vital human capital. Usually, 
repatriates will gain five kinds of knowledge during 
their overseas assignments: First, market related 
knowledge. Antal and Martin pointed out 
respectively that market related knowledge is a 
necessary condition for a company to operating 
successfully in a given market[1][2]. Under 
different circumstance, repatriates will learn to 
understand the new environment, they can gain the 
knowledge relate to the given market, such as local 
language, custom and business operating modes. 
Second, personal skills. These individual skills 
have a wide range, such as cross-culture , openness, 
confidence, flexibility and tolerance. Mayhofe and 
Adler indicated the improvement of repatriates’ 
these kinds of skills[3][4]. Third, managerial skills 
related to job. For the different working 
environment, repatriates should improve their 
managerial skills. Downes and Thomas manifested 
that their communication skills, project 
management skills and problem-solving skills will 
all be improved[5]. Fourth, network knowledge. 
Adler and Martin showed that repatriates’ social 
network will be established and extended. When 
they are doing business in the host county, they will 
interact with lots of local and foreign people, then 
their social network will be established, they can 
also extend their network in parent country. Fifth, 
general managerial knowledge. This kind of 
knowledge will help them become the candidates 
for senior management positions. 
Concerning the five kinds of knowledge, 
comparatively speaking, some of them can be 
coded and transferred to company’s employees 
easily, such as market related knowledge, they are 
called explicit knowledge. Some can be transferred 
partly, such as network knowledge, however, others 
can be transferred hardly or not, for instance, 
personal skills, job related managerial skills and so 
on, they are called tacit knowledge. In order to get 
benefits from the knowledge, the company should 
put emphasis on repatriates management and 
motivation, and promote their knowledge transfer 
to the company. The useful knowledge which was 
arising from and be transferred by the repatriates, 
can be seen as valuable asset which is hard to copy, 
company can preserve and develop this kind of 
asset, and transfer it into rare competitive 
advantages in competition between companies, 
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which is impossible to imitate. However, if the 
company can’t be aware of the value of repatriates’ 
knowledge, or apply the assets without appropriate 
human resource policies and practice, it will lead to 
knowledge spillage, then the under-valued asset 
will bring lose to the company in global 
competition. Therefore, the importance of the 




Characteristics, process and cost of 
repatriates’ knowledge transfer 
 
1.Characteristics of repatriates’ knowledge 
transfer 
In terms of the analysis about the repatriates＇ 
knowledge asset attribute above, we can indicate 
that knowledge transfer consist of explicit 
knowledge transfer and tacit knowledge transfer. 
Market related knowledge is explicit knowledge，it 
can be exchanged between individual employees 
easily, while something like personal skills, or job 
related managerial skills, which is hard to code, 
express or formulate, can not be transferred easily. 
Therefore, in order to enhance knowledge transfer 
effectively, we should focus on understanding the 
characteristics of tacit knowledge, these 
characteristics can be summarized as [6]: (1) 
Implicitness ： Knowledge acquisition needs 
personal to experience, practice and understand. (2) 
Exclusivity: Individuals take the gained knowledge 
as a part of status and self-worth, so usually they do 
not want to share it with others free of charge. (3) 
Situation: Tacit knowledge is different when 
situation changes. (4) Accountability: Personal 
knowledge is directly related to personal 
performance in company, which determines the 
wealth and status individual will get. 
(5)Contribution: Personal knowledge forms 
organization’s knowledge, which is the basis of 
company’s sustainable competitive advantages, and 
will contribute to the competitiveness of the 
company. 
 
2.Process of knowledge transfer 
The process of repatriates transferring their 
knowledge to parent company’s employees is the 
basis of company’s knowledge transfer. Based on 
Szulanski about knowledge transfer process model 
and Alice Lam about knowledge transfer situation 
model[7][8], this study established repatriates’ 
knowledge transfer process model as following 





3. Cost of knowledge transfer 
Knowledge transfer is defined as the process that 
the sender transfers the knowledge to the recipient, 
and should make sure that the recipient understand 
and accept the knowledge. Knowledge transfer 
process involves factors as knowledge sender, 
content of the knowledge, knowledge transfer 
channel and knowledge recipient, all these factors 
will directly affect the transfer cost [9]. Costs of 
repatriates’ knowledge transfer include: 
（1） Cognitive cost. Cognitive cost is the 
result of the unsuccessful mutual understanding 
between sender and recipient, which will lead to 
lose of knowledge. The level of cognitive cost will 
be affected by the content of knowledge, 
knowledge transfer channel, organization 
characteristics of both sender and recipient, willing 
to transfer and experience of knowledge transfer. 
When the degree of tacitness of the knowledge is 
high, or the transfer channel being used can’t be 
understand easily, or knowledge characteristics has 
been changed by the characteristics of parent 
company or the unmatch of different company 
units, or when repatriates lack willing and 
experience to transfer, the cognitive cost will be 
increased. 
（2）  Opportunism cost. For repatriates, 
before knowledge transfer, potential knowledge 
recipient is unknown, so if the knowledge has been 
transferred successfully, the potential recipient 
don’t have to pay for it, moreover, they can resell 
the knowledge with no marginal costs, if parent 
company don’t have any scientific incentive or 
preserve mechanism, this kind of knowledge 
exchange will increase the cost of repatriates’ 
knowledge transfer. In addition, repatriates will be 
glad to see the fact that parent company relies on 
their knowledge, it means they can gain more value, 
and enhance their position in company, therefore, 
this motive to accumulate knowledge personally 
will hamper the share of knowledge, finally 
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Design the repatriates’ knowledge 
transfer incentive mechanism 
1 .Design principle 
According to the above analysis about 
characteristics of repatriates’ knowledge transfer, 
we can analyze the existence of cognitive cost and 
opportunism cost of knowledge transfer cause 
obstacles in knowledge transfer especially tacit 
knowledge transfer. In order to reduce these 
obstacles, the company must establish the incentive 
mechanism to promote the knowledge transfer. 
Based on incentive theories, incentive is divided 
into intrinsic incentive and extrinsic incentive. 
Intrinsic incentive is brought by the job itself 
including the sense of interesting, achievement, 
responsibility and so on, and it performs as 
self-realization. Extrinsic incentive is the rewards 
except job, including the increase in remuneration, 
the promotion, and the improvement of 
interpersonal relationship and so on. If the intrinsic 
incentive and extrinsic incentive are the mutual 
independence and the additive relationship, 
dividing the intrinsic incentive  and extrinsic 
incentive, corresponding to the division of the labor 
psychology that shows the concerning for intrinsic 
incentive and economic psychology that shows the 
concerning for extrinsic incentive, the company can 
manage according to their relative strengths and 
weaknesses to improve the incentive effect, 
however, theoretical research result indicates that 
under the existence of intrinsic incentive, these two 
kinds of incentive can exchange, namely there will 
have the mutual crowding effect [10]. In 
accordance with the economic principle, the 
company pays remuneration based on the staff’s 
marginal productivity, and the reliance on extrinsic 
incentive is more than on intrinsic incentive, the 
ideal extrinsic incentive system strictly obeyed the 
performance to pays remuneration, however, 
because of the existing of the incentive mutual 
crowding effect, all kinds of extrinsic incentive 
based on paying remuneration by performance 
strictly often has non-efficient behaviors in the 
circumstance of high intrinsic incentive, while 
intrinsic incentive has more advantage of 
overcoming the cognitive cost and opportunism 
cost in the process of improving tacit knowledge 
transfer. Therefore, incentive mechanism model in 
this paper is established in the theoretical analysis 
above. 
 
2. Theory model of repatriates’ knowledge 
transfer 
The repatriates’ knowledge transfer is the process 
of transfer their valuable knowledge from overseas 
to the parent company staff which involves two or 
more employees. Their knowledge transfer can 
affect the parent company staff’s behaviors, and 
can be restricted by parent company staff’s 
behaviors simultaneously. Knowledge transfer is 
the dynamic game process between repatriates and 
the parent company staff, so the construction of 
knowledge transfer incentive mechanism is a 
balanced outcome of the two side game actions.  
Assuming that both of repatriates and parent 
company staff are the rational decision-making 
subject, they pursue maximization of individual 
income and their strategies are knowledge transfer 
or not. The value of repatriate A and parent 
company employee B is 1AW  and 1BW  
respectively, their knowledge absorptive capability 
coefficient is Aa （ 0< Aa 1≤ ） and Ba
（0< Ba 1≤ ）separately. New value produced after 
the knowledge transfer is 2AW  and 2BW , and 
the sender’s negative effect brought by the 
knowledge transfer is 3AW  and. 3BW . 
To simplify the question analysis, assuming 
that repatriates and parent company staff have the 
same value and absorptive capability, that means  
111 WWW BA ==  , aaa BA == , then the value 
produced after the knowledge transfer is the same 
as the sender’s negative effect brought by the 
knowledge transfer , namely 
222 WWW BA == and 333 WWW BA == .  
Because repatriates may have game with 
many different employees in parent company, this 
constitutes repeated game and its game payoff 




As to the parent company which want to 
promote effective knowledge transfer, to establish a 
rational incentive mechanism means to make the 
repeated game above to sub-game perfect Nash 
equilibrium, at this time, repatriates A begins to 
choose knowledge transfer and continue to choose 
knowledge transfer, while once A doesn’t choose 
knowledge transfer, he will choose non-transfer 
forever. Similarly, if repatriates A choose 
knowledge transfer, parent company employee B 
will also choose knowledge transfer. Otherwise, if 
repatriates A once chose non-transfer, parent 
company employee B will always choose 
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non-transfer. In this case, (transfer, transfer) is sub 
game perfect Nash equilibrium, and each employee 
obtains the income is 321)1( WWWa −++ .  
Specifically, assumed the discount factor 
is δ , then we analyze repatriates A’s selection 
strategy. If employee A chose non-transfer in a 
certain game stage, his income in this stage 
is 21)1( WWa ++ , but his behavior would trigger 
B’s “never transfer” punishment, so A’s income of 
every subsequent stage is 1W . If A chose 
knowledge transfer, his income in this stage is 
321)1( WWWa −++ , because the both sides 
have knowledge transfer, the income of follow-up 
knowledge transfer process 
is 321)1( WWWa −++ ,and the more times of 
repeated game , the more income. If the repeated 
times are many enough to make total income meet 





121 δδδδδ −+++=++++++ WWWaWWWWWa
 
Then knowledge transfer is A’s optimal choice .  
So, if meets the following conditions: 
)1/()1( 121 δδ −+++= WWWaWA            













δδ   
(2) 
WBWA ≤                                
(3) 
There is  
)/( 213 WaWW +≥δ                    (4) 
That is, when the discount factor  is big 
enough and bigger than , A will choose knowledge 
transfer. 
As to B, assumed )/( 213 WaWW +≥δ , 
because B concerned the income of a certain stage, 
and when only he expected that A would continue 
to choose the knowledge transfer, B would choose 
the knowledge transfer. Because B expected A once 
chose transfer and continues to choose the 
knowledge transfer, the knowledge transfer is the 
optimal choice of B, otherwise, if A once chose 
non-transfer, B would never have knowledge 
transfer with A. 
From the above analysis, it shows that, 
if )/( 213 WaWW +≥δ , (transfer, transfer) is a 
sub game perfect Nash equilibrium in the repeated 
game between repatriates and parent company staff, 
and Pareto optimality (transfer, transfer) is every 
stage’s equilibrium result, namely, they must give 
up the short-term income to obtain long-term 
income, so the staff choose the knowledge transfer 
and realize a win-win situation. 
3. Discussion on theoretical model’s application 
The principle of the construction of above incentive 
mechanism model lied in after introducing the 
repeated game, the staff within organization 
considers about the discount factor of the total 
income rather than once income. As long as the 
discount factor of future income is big enough, the 
effective knowledge transfer can be achieved and 
maintained by the repeated game. This means the 
bigger long-term income of staff within 
organization, the more choice of knowledge 
transfer between employees. However, in reality, 
the company may face a lot of complex situations 
in promoting the effective repatriates’ knowledge 
transfer which can affect the realization to the ideal 
equilibrium state. Analysis as follows: 
(1) The internal situation of parent company, 
the characteristics of both sides in knowledge 
transfer and the different transfer channels required 
by the explicit and tacit knowledge can format the 
obstacles in the proceed of knowledge transfer and 
increase the cognitive cost of knowledge transfer 
which may cause repatriates and parent company 
staff to choose “ knowledge non-transfer 
behaviors”.  
(2) The most difficulties in repatriates’ 
knowledge transfer are obstacles of tacit 
knowledge transfer, which bring about the 
characteristics of tacit knowledge including 
exclusivity, accountability and contribution which 
can increase the opportunism cost of knowledge 
transfer and cause repatriates and parent company 
staff to choose “knowledge non-transfer 
behaviors”. 
(3) The repeated game model cannot realize 
sometimes in the real word for situational factors, if 
the company pays less attention on the intrinsic 
incentive and doesn’t build the awareness of 
long-term incentive mechanism of knowledge 
transfer, it also can lead to both of repatriates and 
parent company staff choose ” knowledge 
non-transfer behaviors”.  
 
Conclusions 
Repatriates are very valuable knowledge assets to 
parent company, however, only when their 
knowledge can be transferred, these assets can play 
their roles. Based on the above, the parent company 
must establish the effective repeated game 
mechanism. And this mechanism can have impact 
of the staff’s choice and produce the optimal 
solution, namely, achieving the sharing purposes in 
the knowledge transfer. Therefore, the following 
measures must be taken: 
 (1)Making the repatriates’ career 
planning.The parent company should have a 
complete career planning about repatriates, 
826 Xiuzhen Jiang, Lin Quan, Weiqin Bao, Yajing Wan 
The 9th International Conference on Electronic Business, Macau, November 30 - December 4, 2009 
including: the expatriate assignments’ nature, 
characteristics, time-span; the selection and 
training of expatriates; all kinds of problems may 
faced during the expatriate work period; the 
commutation with parent company; the 
arrangements after they returning and so on, 
especially the strengthen for the repatriates’ 
planning and management, so that when they return 
after finishing the assignments, they can adapt the 
work in parent company more quickly, have a good 
expectation to using their knowledge and 
experience, and be willing to carry on knowledge 
transfer to parent company. 
(2) Establishing the knowledge transfer and 
sharing environment.The parent company must 
establish the knowledge environment which all of 
employees are willing to transfer and share 
knowledge to increase the discount factor of 
repeated game. Specifically, that is to strengthen 
the mutual communication among the staff so that 
the staff can fully realize the importance of 
knowledge transfer. The company must pay 
attention on the incentive of staff’s knowledge 
transfer and sharing behaviors, such as establishing 
the incentive systems including the knowledge 
salary payment system, knowledge promotion 
system and knowledge training system. 
(3) Strengthening the effect on tacit 
knowledge transfer by the intrinsic incentive. On 
the one hand, the tacit knowledge is often 
accompanied by the team’s creative work and its 
complexity and difficulty makes the participants 
believe completion of the task itself is a kind of 
incentive and challenge. At this time, the parent 
company can increase the intrinsic incentive to 
enhance the participants’ learning and 
communication capacity and to promote the 
sharing knowledge in the team. On the other hand, 
because the tacit knowledge is difficult to be 
monitor ed and to be evaluated which make the 
extrinsic incentive often be ineffective. So parent 
company should rely on the intrinsic incentive to 
form the staff’s self-restricting mechanism which 
can promote the tacit knowledge separated from the 
supervisor and carried on transfer spontaneously, 
thus it will enhance the validity of knowledge 
transfer. 
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